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THE 



BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK 



OCTOBER 19, 1864 



A Paper read before the Massachusetts Military Historical 
Society, December 8, iS'jg 



COL. B. W. CROWNINSHIELD 




ir. 



\ 




i 



THE 



BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK 



OCTOBER 19, 1864 



A Paper read before the Massachusetts Military Historical 
Society, December 8, 1879 



BY 

COL. B. W. CROWNINSHIELD 



CAMBRIDGE 

1879 



C7 



y' 



CEDAR CREEK. 



This battle was the last of the war for the posses- 
sion of the Shenandoah Valley. During the four 
years from 1861 to 1865, each year brought its Shen- 
andoah Valley campaign, and some years there were 
several. What happened in 1864 is a fair illustration 
of the activity of these four years' campaigns, for all 
were lively: the advance of Hunter to Lynchburg 
(which he failed to capture) in June; his retreat, 
chased by Early up to the fortifications of Washing- 
ton, in July; the pursuit of Early via Snicker's Gap by 
the Sixth Corps ; Early's raid across the Potomac and 
burning of Chambersburg in retaliation for Hunter's 
destruction of dwelling-houses. Then, on Sheridan's 
taking command of the Middle Military Division 
(which included the valley) in August, Early was 
pushed back to Fisher's Hill; when, on being rein- 
forced by Anderson's division of Longstreet's corps 
and by Fitzhugh Lee's division of cavalry, which 
came up by way of Chester Gap and Front Royal, he 
pushed Sheridan back to Halltown, near Harper's 
Ferry, only in turn to be driven back to Winchester. 
September 19th the battle of Winchester sent Early 
in haste to Fisher's Hill, from which position, three 



4 CEDAR CREEK. 

days afterwards, he was pursued in complete rout to 
Waynesboro and Staunton. Sheridan desolated the 
upper part of the valley and retired to Cedar Creek 
in October (and on the way the cavalry had a fight, 
in which Rosser was pursued twenty-eight miles up 
to Mount Jackson). Then came the battle of Cedar 
Creek, after which, as far as the main ■ body of the 
army was concerned, except a few reconnaissances, 
came a quiet, not broken until February, when, on 
Sheridan's march to join Grant, the balance of Early's 
command was captured, and the valley became peace- 
ful, only because for the rebels almost nobody was left 
to fight but Jubal himself. But he, with his strange 
activity, betook himself across the mountains of the 
Blue Ridge, and organized himself into an independ- 
ent cavalry command, which a few days afterward 
was run into and dispersed ; upon which the " bad 
old man " (as General Lee is said to have called him) 
was relieved from command by Lee, and retired to 
Lynchburg, being succeeded by Echols. 

What was there peculiar in the valley that it should 
afford such a continuous theatre for action } Many 
things. Looking at the map of the Southern States, 
you will notice that from the Potomac River to At- 
lanta, Georgia, there is only one avenue, one means 
of communication, one pass from west to east, that, 
namely, from Kentucky and Tennessee (whose two 
roads unite at Knoxville) to Virginia by the line of 
road called the Virginia and Tennessee Air Line. 
This line runs through a country between Knoxville 
and Richmond, never visited by our troops, — a rich 
country, with rich valleys branching out from it. Wa- 



CEDAR CREEK. 5 

tered by the James and its branches, and supplied with 
railroad and canal, abounding in coal and iron and 
wheat and forage, it was the natural source of supply 
for Lee's army. At Lynchburg were arsenals and 
foundries and manufactories, which supplied Lee with 
clothing and arms ; and Lynchburg in the north was 
to the rebel armies what Atlanta was in the south. 
Connecting w^ith this valley from the north was the 
Shenandoah Valley, full of* grain and forage, and 
largely populated by a curious people of German ori- 
gin, the Dunkards and Mennonites, who like the Qua- 
kers were non-resistants, and during all the war had 
managed to be non-combatants. They tilled the land 
and raised crops, which became, in the general neg- 
lect of such things in the South on account of the 
war, constantly more necessary to Lee's army. Each 
year about the time the crops ripened a rebel force 
went down the valley to secure and harvest them. 

But apart from this the valley had other values. 
Towards the east numerous gaps opened from the 
valley to Eastern Virginia, with a system of roads 
leading towards Richmond, and through Rockfish 
Gap was a railroad to Staunton from the main line 
running north from Richmond. The valley itself 
had three railroads. The Baltimore and Ohio, across 
the lower part, near to and parallel with the Potomac, 
connected Baltimore and Washington with the West. 
This road is one of the largest corporations in the 
United States, and during the war was of the great- 
est use in bringing troops and supplies from the West. 
It was frequently raided upon by the rebels, and at 
times rendered useless by the destruction of the 



o CEDAR CREEK. 

iron bridge at Harper's Ferry, and other bridges. 
Though useful, it was not a necessity to us, as there 
were several other lines of railroad further north 
which connected the East with the West. A branch 
road connected Harper's Ferry with Winchester, and 
another Alexandria, via Manassas Gap, with Front 
Royal, and thence up the main valley to Mount Jack- 
son. The latter was never of much use to the rebels, 
as it did not connect with their railroad system. 

But the great feature in the way of transportation 
was the valley pike, a well-graded, well-drained, and 
macadamized broad road, leading from Martinsburg 
on the line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, via 
Winchester, Strasburg, etc., to Staunton. This road 
had good feeders (several macadamized) running 
through the gaps into Eastern Virginia and all south 
of Front Royal towards Richmond. By the valley 
pike an army, in all weathers and seasons of the year, 
could march at great speed, and except in very wet 
seasons in many parallel columns, with baggage and 
artillery up. This was always the chosen route for 
the rebel armies to march by to invade Pennsylvania 
and Maryland. No large bridges spanned the rivers 
and creeks it crossed, so that it was always ready 
for the march of troops and trains. 

The valley, being so well cultivated, was an open 
country generally, admirably adapted for fighting, with 
large fields, and woods pretty clear of underbrush. 
Troops, in good weather, could march in any direction, 
independent of roads, and the streams were fordable 
every few miles, even the Shenandoah itself. As the 
principal idea of all the Virginia campaigns was to 



CEDAR CREEK. 7 

cover Washington securely, in the first place, and as 
the valley was the high road thereto, in the earlier 
campaigns attempts were made to fortify the valley 
and interrupt the pike, the " race-track of armies," as 
one writer has aptly called it, by earth-works and forts 
at important points. At Strasburg is an earth-work 
called Fort Banks ; at Winchester are several detached 
forts on the hills, erected by Milroy. All the forti- 
fication, however, served only to supply the rebels, 
who in their invasions of the valley never, until in 
Sheridan's time, failed to defeat our armies, with 
guns of position as well as field-pieces, as attempts 
at permanent occupation gave them larger depots of 
supplies to capture. It really seemed as if there were 
something fatal to our arms and uncanny in the 

valley. 

Whenever our armies advanced beyond Winches- 
ter, their left flank became exposed to any force Lee 
chose to detach from his army in Eastern Virginia 
and send through the gaps into the valley, and the 
roads were so good that Jackson's " foot cavalry," as 
they got to be called, generally effected a surprise 
on our troops. It was this corps that was always 
detached, and their success was so uniform that they 
might be pardoned for thinking themselves invinci- 
ble when in that part of Virginia. The cavalry of 
Lee's army was largely recruited there, and was gen- 
erally sent there to winter, so that every trooper was 
perfectly familiar with all the roads. Admirable roads 
facilitated quick marches, and the advance of our 
troops south, of the rebels north, in the valley, neces- 
sitated always a counter movement by the threatened 
party. 



8 CEDAR CREEK. 

We find, then, Early at Fisher's Hill October 13th, 
to which place he followed, after Sheridan's retreat 
from Staunton, with an army which, though lately 
twice defeated with great loss of men and guns, was 
yet composed entirely of veteran soldiers, to whom all 
the battles of the valley were household words and 
names in which until Sheridan's advent they could 
take pride. His cavalry had in great part had its suc- 
cess there also under Ashby in the beginning of the 
war. The last year had been for his cavalry a cruel 
season. They had been defeated almost uniformly. 
Their leader had been changed, but Rosser, " the sa- 
viour of the valley," as some of his own people called 
him in anticipation when on his way to the front, was 
now shorn of guns, glory, and saviourship. 

Singularly enough Sheridan's army contained many 
troops who had had unfortunate experience in the 
valley fighting the very men who now stood opposite. 
Part of the Nineteenth Corps was in Banks's army 
in the valley in 1862, while the third, division, Sixth 
Corps, were Milroy's old men, and had helped build 
the forts by Winchester. 

To Early and his men, then, the valley was a scene 
of former glory, as it was to many of our men of loss 
and disgrace. To most of our generals it was new 
ground. 

When Sheridan withdrew down the valley to the 
position of Cedar Creek, he had been followed cau- 
tiously by all Early's army except the valiant Rosser, 
and he had good reason to regret his temerity. It 
certainly was not presumptuous to imagine that Early 
had had his bellyful of fighting, and would now con- 



CEDAR CREEK. 9 

tent himself with watching Sheridan. He took up 
the old lines of Fisher's Hill, sending his cavalry out 
on his left to the crossing at Cedar Creek to watch the 
back road, and a small force to his right. Between 
Cedar Creek and Fisher's Hill is Strasburg on the 
Shenandoah River, and between there and the North 
Mountain is a hilly country tolerably well wooded. 
The valley is here about four miles wide, and this 
debatable ground between the armies was open to 
frequent reconnaissances from each side. 

Sheridan himself went to Washington, October 
15th, to meet Secretary of War Stanton and General 
Augur, to consult about the plan of fortifying the 
valley at or near Front Royal submitted by General 
Halleck; and the cavalry which was at Front Royal 
ready to start on a raid was sent back by him to the 
army at Cedar Creek, under General Wright, senior 
officer in temporary command, in consequence of an 
intercepted dispatch taken down and deciphered by 
our signal officers from the rebel signal station on 
Massanutten Mountain. This dispatch was as fol- 
lows : — 

To Lieutenant-General Early: 

Be ready to move as soon as my forces join you, and we will 
crush Sheridan. Longstreet, Lieutenajit- General. 

Anderson's division of Longstreet's corps had come 
up August 15th from Lee, had gone back September 
17th, just before Winchester, and now returned. It 
contained four brigades, and one battalion of artillery, 
probably fourteen guns. This gave Early five divis- 
ions of infantry and two divisions and one brigade 



lO CEDAR CREEK. 

of cavalry, while Sheridan had eight divisions of in- 
fantry and three of cavalry. A large force was always 
used to guard depots and trains, which correspond- 
ingly weakened the force at the front. 

Sheridan cautioned Wright, on sending back the 
cavalry, in the following words: — 

Headquarters Middle Military Division, 
Front Royal, October i6, 1861. 
General, — The cavalry is all ordered back to you ; make your 
position strong. If Longstreet's dispatch is true, he is under the 
impression we have largely detached. I will go over to Augur and 
may get additional news. 

Close up Colonel Powell, who will be at this point. 
If the enemy should make an advance, I know you will defeat 
him. Look well to your ground and be well prepared. Get up 
everything that can be spared. I will bring up all I can, and will 
be up on Tuesday,^ if not sooner. 

P. H. Sheridan, Major- General. 
Major-General H. G. Wright, 
Commanding Sixth Corps. 

Besides the intercepted dispatches, we drew from 
prisoners that some move was contemplated. I was 
at that time Provost Marshal General of the depart- 
ment and army, and it was my duty to interrogate 
prisoners ; also to manage the spies, of whom we had 
thirteen at headquarters. These were all but two 
enlisted men, who chose to take their lives in their 
hands and go out and seek information. They wore 
rebel uniform, and would go out each day under in- 
structions from headquarters. On the i6th and 17th 
they went over to try and capture the rebel vedettes 

^ The 1 6th was Sunday. The battle was fought October 19th, 
Wednesday. 



CEDAR CREEK. 1 1 

at the back road crossing, and each day succeeded in 
bringing in, not cavalry, but North Carolina infantry 
soldiers, who said that they had been carried to the 
crossing behind the cavalry soldiers, about a brigade 
in number.-^ 

Of the position our army occupied at Cedar Creek 
it is perhaps enough to say that in front, facing south, 
it was bordered by Cedar Creek, — a stream at that 
time fordable everywhere, but running in a narrow 
channel with steep banks, which rose almost abruptly 
all along the front and for a long way to the right. 
Meadow Creek, a little brook, ran into Cedar Creek, 
about three fourths of a mile from where the pike 
crossed on a bridge, and separated the camp of the 
Nineteenth Corps from the Sixth Corps. The latter 
came into camp after the rest of the army, having 
been recalled from White Post, while on their way 
to Washington and Grant's army after the rest of the 
army had gone into camp, and had pitched their tents 
in pretty compact order, just across Meadow Creek, 
and withdrawn a little to the rear from the Nine- 
teenth Corps line, which extended from the mouth of 
Meadow Creek to the pike bridge. The Nineteenth 
Corps camp lay on a plain, sloping down from the 
pike and from the line of Cedar Creek, towards 
Meadow Creek. This ridge, one hundred and forty 
feet above the level of the creek, and very steep 
towards it, was crowned with part of the Nineteenth 
Corps artillery, pointing south and west across Cedar 
Creek, and protected by slight earth-works. To the 

1 Early says they went to surprise our cavalry there, and succeeded 
in taking a picket post. 



12 CEDAR CREEK. 

rear this plain rose again gradually up to Bellegrove 
House (or the Hite House), where were General 
Sheridan's headquarters, and also General Crook's- 
Crook's corps were all across the pike ; the second 
division and Kitchen's provisional division on a bar- 
ren hill that overlooked all the plain, in which were 
the Nineteenth Corps, Sixth Corps, and headquarters. 
The hill also looked away to the left and left front, 
and on across the Shenandoah River, into which Ce- 
dar Creek empties in front of and a little to the left of 
Crook's corps. His first division was encamped on a 
knoll directly south of the other division and in plain 
sight of it, though separated by a ravine, and beyond, 
in front and to the left, were woods. This knoll is 
beyond the general line of the Cedar Creek position 
and makes a sort of bastion to it, and the men had 
constructed some little intrenchments here. The pick- 
ets of this corps were thrown out to the river and con- 
nected with the cavalry pickets, which guarded the 
river, and whose reserve was two miles away on the 
road from Middletown to Front Royal. 

When General Sheridan put his army into camp 
at Cedar Creek, he placed Merritt's division of cav- 
alry out to the left of Crook's corps on the road run- 
ning to Front Royal, and at the place where this road 
is joined by the road running to the fords of the 
Shenandoah and Cedar Creek in front of Crook. 
Powell was also sent out to Front Royal, making all 
this country to the left secure. General Wright put 
the cavalry on his right, all of it but Powell, whom 
Sheridan in his dispatch ordered him to draw in close. 
The rebel divisions of Gordon, Ramseur, Pegram, 



CEDAR CREEK. 1 3 

and Payne's cavalry were actually formed for the at- 
tack in the field next where Merritt's cavalry had been 
encamped October 14th. 

It happened that no supply train was up at the 
time, and the army was not incumbered with its usual 
transportation, but the plain (a pretty level one) was 
dotted with ambulances and ammunition wagons in 
places. This was the situation in our army. All we 
knew of Early was that he was at Fisher's Hill. But 
he knew a great deal more about our force and posi- 
tion than we did ourselves, and apparently saw through 
our weakness, while we were conscious only of our 
strength. It is rather singular how often a very strong 
position has proved an element of disaster. The 
strongest places have been captured, and generally by 
surprise. 

Massanutten Mountain extends abruptly beyond 
the line of Fisher's Hill, and a little beyond Stras- 
burg, north. It has three tops, and is sometimes 
called Three Top Mountain. Its sides are densely 
wooded nearly down to the river. On the extreme 
northern end of the mountain was the rebel signal 
station, looking directly down into our camps. Every- 
thing must have been distinctly visible, and the posi- 
tion of every regiment and each picket post and ve- 
dette clearly seen. The want of cavalry on the left 
rendered that flank much exposed, and at the mercy 
of an enemy who could once place himself in posi^ 
tion there across the river and creek. How to get 
there was the difficulty. To surmount this and to 
leave no room for doubt. General Earl3^ in his " Last 
Year of the War," tells us that two of his division 



14 CEDAR CREEK. 

generals went up to the signal station, and there made 
their plan of the battle with the real map and the real 
enemy spread out beneath them. Surely never be- 
fore was battle so carefully and definitely planned. 
General Gordon, to whom the task was given, with 
the greater part of the infantry, unimpeded by artil- 
lery or wagons, to make the attack and surprise the 
Eighth Corps in their beds, told off each detail of the 
plan to his generals afterwards at Early's headquar- 
ters, and left nothing to be explained by dispatches 
and aids. So much for the making of the plan. The 
design itself was simple enough. Gordon to take 
his own, Ramseur's, and Pegram's divisions round 
through the woods along the base of Massanutten 
Mountain, and to cross by two fords the Shenandoah, 
rush upon Crook's men before daylight, and capture 
or disperse all who were not killed in the attack. The 
1 8th was a superb specimen of an autumn day, warm 
in the sun, clear and still. As soon as the sun was 
well down, Gordon commenced his march. The men 
took nothing but arms and ammunition with them ; 
even their canteens were left, because likely to make 
a noise and discover the march. Through woods by 
paths known only to the natives, this wonderful 
march would have been impossible to any but men 
used to the country, and confident in their officers 
and their luck. Five o'clock, October 19th, found all 
the expeditionary troops in their places, ready for the 
attack. The sun rose at about 6.15. Kershaw^ was 
in his place, and Early himself, with all the artillery 

^ Kershaw was added to the attacking force by Early, and joined him 
by marching through Strasburg and crossing Cedar Creek near its mouth. 



CEDAR CREEK. 1 5 

of his army and Wharton's division, was on the crest 
of the hill beyond Cedar Creek, ready to go forward 
by the pike at the sound of Gordon's attack. Early's 
cavalry, on his left, was ready to chime in at the proper 
moment and make a diversion in his favor. This was 
the position of the rebel army at five a. m., October 
19th. In Sheridan's army we know how the troops 
were posted. Five o'clock found the army under the 
command of Major-General H. G. Wright, of the 
Sixth Corps, who was not at army headquarters, but at 
the headquarters of the Sixth Corps, across Meadow 
Creek, — the extreme right of the infantry line. A 
part of Sheridan's staff, including its chief and several 
of Sheridan's most trusted aids, was away with him. 
General Crook, the commander of the Eighth Corps, 
just about to be attacked, was at his headquarters at 
Bellegrove House, a quarter of a mile from the near- 
est part of his command. His troops were all asleep 
in their tents. General Emory had headquarters 
among his troops, and he had always made it the cus- 
tom to turn out his command under arms at reveille. 
This morning the second division and one brigade 
of the first division, Nineteenth Corps, were to have 
made a reconnaissance, and were awakened before 
daylight, and were cooking their breakfast, as it hap- 
pened, when the attack was made. Besides an admi- 
rable plan of march and attack, admirably executed, 
the rebels were assisted by a dense fog, which only 
cleared" away an hour after sunrise. 

The first firing occurred while it was yet dark, — a 
sharp ringing volley away to the left ; so at least it ap- 
peared to be to the staff at Bellegrove House. Those 



1 6 CEDAR CREEK 

on the right say that the first attack came fi-om the 
rebel cavalry away to our right. Probably the attack 
was simultaneous. It was known to all the generals 
that a reconnaissance in force would be made, and 
the cavalry, hearing the guns, thought for some time 
the firing was from that, and were not at first alarmed. 
We all turned out in haste and alarm, but after wait- 
ing full ten minutes and hearing nothing more, we all 
turned in again, to be almost immediately routed cut 
by repeated and louder volleys of musketry, this time 
unmistakably over by Crook's corps camp. Day was 
now dawning but in the fog everything was quite ob- 
scure. An officer came galloping up to Crook's head- 
quarters, and that general and his staff dashed off in 
the direction of the attack. Almost immediately Gen- 
eral Wright and staff came up on horseback, greatly 
excited and utterly ignorant of what had happened. 
In the obscurity and confusion nobody could enlighten 
him accurately; indeed, nobody knew exactly what 
had happened further than that the firing came nearer 
each minute. 

The first firing was Kershaw's attack on the ad- 
vanced division of Crook, and was delivered on three 
sides at once. This division offered almost no resist- 
ance, but fled Mdldly, deserting their camp and its 
contents, including seven guns, almost without firing 
a gun.^ Kershaw's division was enabled by the 
woods to approach close to the camp before alarming 
it, but Gordon's other divisions, after crossing, had to 

* The enemy came on without throwing out any advanced guards and 
followed the advanced pickets immediately, coming into the camp close 
upon their heels. 



CEDAR CREEK. 1 7 

advance quite a distance before delivering their at- 
tack, which was the second firing heard. They were, 
however, not seen until close at hand, on account of 
the fog. The alarm had been given by Kershaw's 
attack on the first division, and this gave the second 
division an opportunity to make some resistance. 
Gordon's line advanced from the east and took them 
in flank, for they looked for an attack from the direc- 
tion of their other division, which was now pouring 
wildly by and through their camp. The second divis- 
ion had no breastworks or intrenchments, and, sur- 
prised and attacked in flank by so formidable a force, 
it offered but slight resistance. Some of its artillery 
managed to get away, but none was used against the 
enemy. Simultaneously with Gordon's attack Early 
pushed down with Wharton's division, and opening 
with some of his guns on the works in front of the 
Nineteenth Corps pushed the others down by the pike 
to the bridge, and, on Gordon and Kershaw coming 
up abreast this position and clearing the way, Whar- 
ton's division and all the artillery crossed to our side 
of Cedar Creek. But before this was accomplished 
the second division, Nineteenth Corps, and one bri- 
gade of the first division, which had expected to go 
on the reconnaissance, formed to resist the enemy, 
the odd brigade going across the pike to the assist- 
ance of the Eighth Corps, and the division taking 
up its position on the high ridge facing south. The 
brigade was speedily driven back towards its camp and 
the division received a fire on its front from Wharton 
and the rebel guns in front, and a fire of all arms in 
left flank and rear, from the advancing divisions of 



1 8 CEDAR CREEK. 

Gordon's men. All this time the fog was very dense, 
and this added immensely to the confusion and diffi- 
culty of comprehending the true situation. Some of 
our troops took bodies of rebels to be their own men,* 
and only found out their error by being fired upon. 
The Eighth Corps took no further part as a corps 
in the doings of the day, but fled in the direction of 
Winchester.^ They were joined by great numbers 
from the Nineteenth and Sixth Corps also, though 
both the latter kept their organization. Before the 
Nineteenth Corps extricated itself from its peculiar 
position some parts of it became heavily engaged, 
notably one regiment, the one hundred and four- 
teenth New York, which was put in to hold the 
enemy long enough to enable the second division to 
march by them to the rear. This regiment lost in 
a few minutes nearly half its number, killed and 
wounded. The Nineteenth Corps finally arrived 
across Meadow Creek in considerable confusion, and 
with greatly reduced numbers, and proceeded to form 
line to resist the enemy's advance upon our extreme 
right. 

The Sixth Corps, under command of General Rick- 
etts, was the only part of the infantry not under the 
enemy's fire at the first attack. Some regiments were 
somewhat demoralized by the stream of fugitives from 
the Nineteenth Corps, running to the rear through 
their camps, and they contributed somewhat to that 
body themselves, especially the third division. But 
Ricketts soon had his men in motion towards the 

^ General Crook worked hard, and, by the time of the last attack, 
had succeeded in reorganizing a part of his command in rear of Mer- 
ritt's cavalry. They took some part in the final charge at four p. m. 



CEDAR CREEK. 1 9 

enemy marching on his side of Meadow Creek, and 
with the second division he took a position on a knoll, 
wooded in parts, and faced southeast towards the 
Eighth Corps camp with artillery, and advanced from 
this position a little toward Middletown into the val- 
le}^ Here he fought Gordon's, Wharton's, Ramseur's, 
and Pegram's divisions, which were posted on high 
ground close by the pike and to the westward of it, 
facing northwest ; bringing his other divisions up to 
support the second. This prompt arrival of the fresh 
troops of the Sixth Corps checked Early's success, 
repulsed the attack of his divisions, and put him for a 
time on the defensive. It caused him to change his 
line of battle, and was the first successful resistance of 
the day to his attack. Getty's fine division made a 
brilliant fight of it, and was seconded by the other 
two divisions. Early's change in his line necessitated 
a change in the position of the Sixth Corps, and 
Getty's division was drawn back a little to the crest 
of the hill in their rear. This was the turning point 
in Early's attack, and but for this the final success 
could not have been possible, for it gave a breathing 
spell, most necessary, to our disorganized troops. 
Meanwhile, Kershaw moved across the pike to and 
beyond Bellegrove House and formed the extreme 
left of Early's line, operating against the Nineteenth 
Corps, being a little later joined by Gordon's division. 
Wharton was moved, together with Wofford's brigade 
of Kershaw's division, up to the right of the line near 
Middletown, and the greater part of the artillery sup- 
ported them. It was now eight o'clock, and the sun 
had burned off the fog, and a bright, clear, and pleas- 



20 CEDAR CREEK. 

ant autumn day succeeded the foggy morning. The 
surprise was over, and there was time to think. The 
Eighth Corps was hors de combat; the Nineteenth 
had done some good fighting, retained its organiza- 
tion, and obeyed its officers, although it had been 
through a fearfial ordeal. It had been attacked in 
front, flank, and rear, by an enemy who appeared to 
be everywhere. It had been run over by fugitives ; 
a part of its artillery had been abandoned on the 
ridge, because the descent was too steep for guns 
to be got out except by passing in direction of the 
enemy, and in some cases the limbers could not be 
got up to the guns on the steep hill. Some por- 
tions of the command had made a desperate resist- 
ance, and met with severe loss under most depressing 
circumstances. When the corps re-formed across 
Meadow Creek, it was with depleted ranks, though 
not with diminished courage. Even the Sixth Corps, 
which was further removed from the fugitives and 
hardly under fire at all, had lost heavily in stragglers. 
Fortunately at this moment, when a bold push down 
the pike would have cut Sheridan's army off from its 
line of retreat and placed it at the mercy of the rebel 
army, who could have advanced rapidly down that 
superb road, which was everywhere higher than and 
commanding the land to the west where our army 
was, Early's men desisted from the attack ; many left 
the ranks and ran through the camps of the Eighth 
and Nineteenth Corps, plundering the tents, and upon 
all came a wonderful change from that energy and 
courage which had made the march of the night be- 
fore and the morning's attack upon our army. The 



CEDAR CREEK. 21 

attack was not abandoned, for a lively fight took place 
between Getty's men and the divisions in front of 
them. The attack was, however, not vigorously 
pressed by the enemy, and time was given to what 
remained of Sheridan's infantry to rally and consoli- 
date ; and Torbert, at last finding out the state of af- 
fairs, moved Merritt's division across to the pike just 
north of Middletown, securing that invaluable avenue 
to our army. 

Sheridan's cavalry, about 7,000 strong (except Pow- 
ell, who was on the river near Front Royal and who 
held the road all day), was encamped on the extreme 
right and in rear of the camp of the Sixth Corps. 
When the morning attack occurred, Custer and Low- 
ell's brigade (which was at first sent to help him, but 
soon returned to Middletown) confronted the rebel 
cavalry at the back road, while Merritt's division, with 
Torbert at the head, came over toward Middletown, 
and formed in column of regiments, waiting orders. 

It was hours, however, before any were received, 
or before Torbert knew exactly the situation of affairs 
at the front. My own experience that morning made 
me a witness of this peculiar fact. When the at- 
tack of Gordon became a certainty, Sheridan's head- 
quarters came almost immediately under the fire of 
the rebels, and tents were struck and packed under a 
heavy musketry fire. I had at the time a squad of 
rebel prisoners, awaiting the arrival and departure 
of the next supply train to be sent down the valley, 
I think there were altogether about three hundred 
of them, guarded by the iwenty-sixth Massachusetts 
battalion (the veterans of the old Massachusetts sixth 



22 CEDAR CREEK. 

regiment, which acquired notoriety as being the first 
regiment to leave the State in 1861, and the first 
to be fired on at Baltimore). Getting on my horse 
I went at once to the prisoners' camp (whither I had 
already sent orders), which lay between the head- 
quarters and the Eighth Corps camp and found them 
nearly ready to move and in perfect order, although 
some had been wounded. After dispatching them 
off by a country road to rendezvous with the head- 
quarters train at the north end of Middletown, I went 
out towards Crook's corps, to see what could be done 
in stopping the rout and establishing new lines. 

I came soon into a steady stream of fugitives go- 
ing to the rear across the fields to the west of the 
pike. All said nothing remained of the corps, and 
that the rebel cavalry were in Middletown and his 
infantry in possession of the pike. It was still very 
foggy, and you could not see far. Although not 
running, the men poured steadily to the rear, offi- 
cers and men alike, and no efforts of mine could 
stop one. I waited until two pieces of artillery came 
along without an officer, and without caissons. This 
seemed a chance to do something, so I rode along 
with the guns to the hill afterwards occupied by the 
second division. Sixth Corps, where I placed them in 
battery in an excellent position on the crest of the 
hill, and looked about for supports. I got a regimen- 
tal color, about two hundred men, and finally a major ; 
formed a line, and put him in command, expecting 
great things. I then went after more men to support, 
and found and brought them back only to find guns, 
colors, men, and major gone. Seeing it was hopeless 



CEDAR CREEK. 23 

to try, I gave it up, and was going to another part of 
the field, when Getty's division came along in perfect 
order and occupied the ground I had chosen. With 
their provost marshal I posted his guards, and a smart 
fight began immediately. I then rode into Middle- 
town streets, crossing Meadow Creek, through a corn- 
field, and found rebel cavalry there, and not a Union 
soldier in sight on the pike. At this time Early could 
have pushed down the pike without opposition, and if 
he had done so, there would have been no retrieving 
the day for our side. Leaving the town and going 
towards our right, I soon came upon the cavalry 
massed. Recognizing me as one of the headquar- 
ters staff. General Torbert rode out to meet me, and 
asked if I brought him orders. I said no, and asked 
if it were possible he had no orders ; and then I 
learned with astonishment that he neither had received 
orders, nor did he know fully of the disaster of the 
early morning. I advised him at once to make haste 
to seize the pike, and he did so with Merritt's divis- 
ion, and on that line this part of the cavalry fought 
all the rest of the day, while Custer with the greater 
part of his force (the rest keeping Rosser in check), 
operated on the right flank, both fighting Early's in- 
fantry. 

I now went further over to our right and came to 
the troops of the Nineteenth Corps, which, after some 
time holding the rebels in check, had been slowly 
withdrawn from one position to another, until at this 
time they occupied the crest of a hill which sloped 
away gradually to the south to the old camp of the 
Sixth Corps in the morning. General Emory with his 



24 CEDAR CREEK. 

staff was with his men, and when I came up he was 
telling them emphatically that he would not retreat 
any further, that there he would stand and fight; and 
his men were making breastworks of rails, and even 
digging a little. I stayed there quite a while, watch- 
ing his preparations and the advance of the rebels, — 
Gordon's and Kershaw's divisions, who were slov/ly 
and in fine order coming up the slope, their guns 
throwing solid shot up the hill at Emory's corps. 
While we were talking, an aid of General Wright 
rode up and gave General Emory orders to retire. 
I turned and saw the first division of the Sixth Corps 
just coming out of a piece of woods in retreat towards 
the pike, and rode over and had quite a talk with Gen- 
eral Wheaton. We discussed the events of the day 
and the probable results. This division, as well as 
Emory's corps, was at this time apparently in perfect 
order, and as quiet as if on a common march. Whea- 
ton marched over obliquely toward the pike, which 
soon came into view across the fields, and one thing 
at once struck me as curious, — that the stream of 
men was now going towards Middletown. Aston- 
ished, I left Wheaton and galloped over to the pike, 
where I learned that Sheridan had just passed up;^ 
and directly after meeting General Forsythe, chief of 
staff, I received orders to go to Newtown, form a 
guard, and collect all the stragglers I could and bring 
them up to the front. This I proceeded to do, and 
finally collected about two thousand men of all corps 
and brought them up and turned them over to the 
command of General Crook, then on our extreme left 
and rear. 

^ As well as can be ascertained, it was half past eleven o'clock. 



CEDAR CREEK. 25 

From the time the Sixth Corps became engaged, at 
about nine a. m., until Sheridan came up, about noon, 
the attacks of the enemy were on the whole feeble and 
ineffective ; at times better sustained, but not appar- 
ently under any strong general direction. In General 
Early's account of the fight he says that his men were 
to a great degree scattered about in our camps en- 
gaged in plundering, and that they could not be ral- 
lied to their commands, which, thus enfeebled, could 
not be pushed forward vigorously. Whatever was the 
reason, they fought with less spirit. For good reasons 
our ranks were as much diminished as Early's, and 
more so, and the soldiers looked behind, and longed 
for some change. All felt the want of generalship, 
and it was a common remark that they were not 
whipped, and they wondered why they constantly re- 
treated. The rebels were slowly gaining ground and 
our men yielding it, with now and then a sharp fight, 
but generally the fighting was desultory. There was 
not at the time Sheridan came up, nor had there been 
at all during the morning, a continuous line of battle 
formed by General Wright. 

When Merritt came upon the pike just to the north 
of Middletown, he found himself opposed by rebel 
infantry, Wharton's division and Wofford's brigade, 
who were posted in a hollow road running nearly at 
right angles across the pike. Some were in the houses 
and fired from the windows. Artillery was in posi- 
tion on the edge of the town, and to our left, in woods 
beyond the town, were Payne's cavalry, who fought 
dismounted, and never took a very active part in the 
battle. Merritt held his place here all day with his 



26 CEDAR CREEK. 

division, and entirely unassisted by infantry. The 
part of Powell's division which had been at the ford 
on the Front Royal road came in by cross roads and 
joined Merritt. 

After the Sixth Corps became engaged, the enemy 
extended his line to the west, and formed a line con- 
tinuously from about one eighth of a mile beyond the 
pike to the east, to the old camp of the Sixth Corps, 
and this line was advanced during the morning and 
until four p. m., until beyond the northerly part of 
Middletown, at right angles with the pike. This 
line on both flanks overlapped the line formed by 
Sheridan. General Sheridan had arrived at Win- 
chester October i8th, from Washington, and passed 
the night there. Early in the morning the guns were 
heard, but he at first supposed they were fired by 
Grover's division, Nineteenth Corps, in making the 
reconnaissance. Hearing the noise increase, he 
mounted and hurried up the pike ; meeting at Mill 
Creek the first fugitives, he got the news which sent 
him flying to Middletown, and inspired the army with 
new courage. Winchester is fourteen miles from 
Middletown. 

When that general came up and relieved General 
Wright, the second division of the Sixth Corps was 
near the pike, facing Early, but to the west the first 
and third divisions were in retreat, and before Sher- 
idan stopped him, Emory was with his corps con- 
siderably in rear of the Sixth Corps. These were 
promptly brought back, and a line formed parallel to 
that of Early's army, which was then halted getting 
ready to attack. Sheridan rode along his line seeing 



CEDAR CREEK. 27 

for himself all his troops, and saying a word or two 
as he went along to encourage them, to which they 
responded with cheers. Powell had sent informa- 
tion of the advance of a rebel force from Front 
Royal, on the Newtown road.^ Until this was proved 
to be false, the attack was delayed, otherwise the final 
battle would have begun sooner in the day At four 
o'clock Early's line advanced, anticipating Sheridan's 
attack. His attack was feeble and was easily repulsed, 
and in about fifteen minutes afterwards the order to 
make a counter attack was given. At first it was not 
successful. But very soon on the right, Dwight's first 
division, Nineteenth Corps, which, after the repulse 
of the rebels, was put on the extreme right (it had be- 
fore been in rear of the second division), attacked, got 
Kershaw on his front started, and the cavalry and 
second division followed it up. Gordon's division 
broke, the panic extended, and a break occurred in 
Early's line, through which D wight followed, breaking 
off the rebels as he went, and when he came out into 
open ground he found himself far in advance of any 
of our infantry, and in rear of Early's line. Taking 
him, from his position, to be the enemy, the Sixth 
Corps artillery fired into his ranks. 

Meadow Creek runs past Middletown, parallel to 
the pike, and makes quite a ravine, though the land is 
cultivated ; and the plateau on which Middletown lies 
is by this ravine separated from the wooded hills be- 
yond, where the panicky part of Early's men now 

^ Lomax, commanding a division of rebel cavalry, was ordered by- 
Early to advance from Front Royal and come into the battle on our left 
flank, but the order failed to reach Lomax, and no advance vi^as made. 



28 CEDAR CREEK. 

were. Defending Middletown were Wharton's and 
Pegram's divisions and Wofford's brigade, well sup- 
ported by artillery and a few cavalry. Opposite them 
on our side were, to the left (east) of the pike, Mer- 
ritt's and part of Powell's cavalry, and on the west side 
Getty's division, Sixth Corps. Custer had brought over 
to the pike part of his command, but Sheridan sent 
him to the right flank. The fighting about and be- 
yond Middletown was for a while most obstinate. The 
rebels were behind stone walls in open fields. Our 
cavalry did not hesitate to charge these troops mount- 
ed again and again. The rebels stood manfully, and 
repulsed all attacks for a while, realizing that all now 
depended on their holding their ground. Finally, 
seeing their line broken and in flight on the other 
part of the field, our troops gaining their rear, and 
pressed vigorously in front, they yielded, but not in 
disorder at first. They were bravely led, and yet made 
several attempts to repel the attacks, but finally, and 
just about sundown, they broke and joined in the 
general rout. The rebels had here a large number 
of guns, but when the collapse came, guns and men 
seemed to vanish as if they had been swallowed up in 
the ground. Merritt charged with all his cavalry, but 
they captured no guns on our side of Cedar Creek. 
Crossing a little below the bridge, they pursued the 
enemy up to the foot of Fisher's Hill. Had one half 
hour more of daylight been left, it is probable that 
but few of Early's men would have escaped, but know- 
ing the country, and aided by darkness, they broke for 
the fields and woods, and though our cavalry were 
miles ahead of them, thousands got away and joined 



CEDAR CREEK. 29 

Early in the lines of Fisher's Hill during the night. 
Their artillery was captured all along the road, across 
Cedar Creek, as well as ambulances and wagons in 
great numbers. It is said that Early himself was at 
one time in our hands, but escaped in the confusion. 
Just beyond Strasburg is a small bridge across a 
brook. The bridge, not more than ten or twelve feet 
across, had become impassable from the breakage of a 
plank or two. A wagon was overturned, and by this 
accident everything on wheels behind this wagon fell 
into our hands. 

Next day our trophies amounted to about 1,200 pris- 
oners, forty-eight cannon, fifty-two caissons, large piles 
of small arms, and wagons by the score, ambulances, 
etc., and seven battle-flags. D wight's division crossed 
the creek, and advancing to the top of the hill beyond 
remained there during the night. The rest of the 
army (except the cavalry) went into their old camps. 

This is briefly an account of the events of this won- 
derful day. 

Early's plan of attack, if the credit belongs to him, 
is certainly deserving of all credit. To prevent Sher- 
idan from detaching part of his force and sending it to 
Grant, a demonstration had to be made. To attack his 
victorious army in a strong position with troops that 
had been repeatedly beaten and lost nearly all their 
artillery was a task demanding boldness and ingenuity. 
The plan was worthy the occasion, and the execution 
of all, up to eight o'clock, as brilliant a feat of arms as 
the war afforded. But whatever Early could say of 
his men for deserting their colors to plunder, more 
could be said of his want of generalship in neglecting 



so CEDAR CREEK. 

to push down and seize the pike — a most fatal error ; 
but even had he pushed hard in the attack upon 
our shattered army, which was handled with great 
want of decision, success would have been sure. It 
is one of those unaccountable things in war that jus- 
tify Solomon in saying: "The battle is not to the 
strong." What finally happened to Early that day is 
but what every man in the army felt and said all day 
was sure to happen " if only Phil Sheridan were 
here ! " 

The surprise of the morning was complete, and it 
is no discredit to the men in the camps. The whole 
situation of the troops on the left flank was inexcus- 
able. Before Sheridan left for Washington a strong 
force of cavalry had been encamped beyond Crook, 
but General Wright had placed them, when Sheridan 
had returned them to him, on the right, and Powell 
was left so far away as to be no protection. An at- 
tack from across the Shenandoah was not a thino- to 
be reasonably anticipated, to be sure ; but a proper 
picketing of the river, and guarding of roads leading 
to our left flank, would have made the surprise diffi- 
cult and unlikely to succeed. The fog of the morning 
added immensely to the success of Gordon's attack, 
and left the second division of the Eighth Corps in 
doubt where the attack was to occur. They were 
consequently taken at fearful disadvantage, and their 
rout became a necessity. Probably no troops in the 
world would have done any better, situated as they 
were. These were the very men who behaved splen- 
didly at Winchester, and who turned Early's flank at 
Fisher's Hill, and General Crook was a fine officer. 



CEDAR CREEK. 3 1 

The rout of the Eighth Corps left Emory's flank 
and rear exposed, and at the same time he received 
the attack of Wharton in front, aided by powerful ar- 
tillery. Emory's habit of turning his men out under 
arms at reveille probably saved his corps this day from 
the fate of Crook's soldiers. General Emory himself 
was promptly on the scene and had two horses killed 
in the first quarter of an hour. Seeing the necessity 
of getting his men across Meadow Creek before they 
could be properly rallied, he pushed out the one 
hundred and fourteenth New York regiment (his 
headquarters guard), which lost in a moment almost 
half their number in sacrificing themselves to gain 
time for the balance of the corps to cross the creek. 
Although in the confusion the corps lost a large 
part of its numbers in stragglers, it was steady the 
balance of the day, always ready for its share of the 
fighting ; and in the final attack of the day, which 
decided the fate of Early, it was an attack by Dvvight's 
first division which made the beginning of the end. 

Of the Sixth Corps Sheridan said in his report that 
" Getty's division [the second] confronted the enemy 
from the first attack of the morning until the battle 
was decided." There was some unsteadiness in the 
other divisions at times, and all the divisions furnished 
something towards the stragglers, but the corps was 
true to its well-earned reputation gained in the Army 
of the Potomac. By its steadiness near Middletown, 
early in the day, opportunity for rallying our army 
was given, and the final success was made possible. 

In this battle, as at the battle of Winchester, Tor- 
bert's cavalry had to fight infantry in the open fields. 



32 CEDAR CREEK, 

That is to say our cavalry was not protected by woods, 
and presented a fair mark all day for the rebel musketry 
and artillery. The rebels themselves were protected 
by stone-walls and houses, so that no proper oppor- 
tunity for charging occurred. Feeling that on them 
depended the holding of the pike, the cavalry pushed 
in against the rebel infantry under circumstances 
which made success almost impossible. They charged 
right up to the stone-walls and close to the rebel 
guns, and at their head fell that fine officer, Colonel 
Lowell, of the Second Massachusetts Cavalry, in 
command of the regular brigade of cavalry. These 
charges were repeated several times, only to be re- 
pulsed. On the right of our infantry was Custer's 
division. In the early morning he was attacked by 
Rosser, but found no difficulty in sending him back 
the way he came. In the afternoon, with part of his 
command, he came over from the back road, and 
finally fought on Emory's right, and charged with his 
cavalry the infantry of Kershaw and Gordon. He 
crossed the creek near the mouth of Meadow Creek, 
and pursued Early to Fisher's Hill. It was by his 
men that most of the captures were made, as they 
were the first to cross the creek. 

In this battle the rebel cavalry had little to say. 

It is only justice to say that our army was not 
handled with ability all the day until Sheridan's ar- 
rival. There was an entire lack of combination, a 
want of grip, a feebleness which came near being 
fatal. The want of preparation, in view of the cir- 
cumstances and of General Sheridan's positive orders 
to prepare for an attack, was most remarkable. Ap- 



CEDAR CREEK. 33 

parently nothing was done but to order the reconnais- 
sance. Early's army was numerically inferior to Sher- 
idan's, no doubt, although it is certain that at four 
p. M. his infantry line overlapped Sheridan's on both 
flanks; and that was a single line, too, excepting a 
part of the Nineteenth Corps, and not a heavy one. 
In cavalry we were far superior in numbers. Prob- 
ably one half Sheridan's infantry was at the rear 
among the stragglers at four p. m. At this time every 
man in Early's army was a veteran, tried in scores of 
battles, while in our ranks one third of the men had 
not served a year, and were certainly not veterans. 

Early's account of his forces and their battles is 
a wonderful story, fully entitled to rank with Miinch- 
hausen's. 

In referring to his army he speaks of them as so 
many " muskets." In his own estimates he never 
makes his forces over one third of ours. You cannot 
help thinking that possibly one musket was carried 
by two, three, or four men. 

In his " Last Year of the War," he gives his losses 
at Winchester and Fisher's Hill, together, at less than 
4,000 men. I counted at Winchester, the day after 
the battle, in one squad, 1,806 unwounded prisoners ; 
the wounded captured in Winchester numbered at 
least 500 (350 in one single place). There were great 
numbers of his dead unburied on the field, and I re- 
ceived over 1,000 wounded further up the valley, who 
were wounded in that battle, and removed during the 
afternoon of the fight. His losses could not possibly 
have been less than 3,500, and were probably over 
4,000. 



34 CEDAR CREEK. 

At Fisher's Hill we captured i,8oo prisoners; and 
in the two fights Early certainly lost 6,000, and prob- 
ably over 7,000, men. From these numbers an esti- 
mate of his troops can be easily made. Altogether 
during the campaign, I had on the Provost Marshal's 
books record of 7,000 unvvounded prisoners, who were 
soldiers, besides which there were a large number of 
civil prisoners sent to the rear. 

Colonel E. B. Parsons, who succeeded me as Pro- 
vost Marshal General, in an official communication, 
puts the actual number of prisoners on the books at 
13,000; and this from August, 1864, to March, 1865. 

Early says he lost " about " 60 pieces of artillery 
altogether. Our books showed that we captured loi 
guns. Deducting 18, which at Cedar Creek were re- 
captured, after the disaster of the morning, leaves 83 
pieces. 

He speaks in his book of the " incapacity of his 
opponent " in one place ; in another, he says that for 
not utterly annihilating him at Winchester " Sheri- 
dan ought to have been cashiered." All through his 
report of the valley campaign he abuses Sheridan. 

* Early was himself a good fighter, a general of great 
energy, and undoubted zeal and courage. He never 
seemed to know when he w^as beaten ; but after his 
defeats, in the language of the prize-ring, he always 
" came up smiling." For his defeats he lost the con- 
fidence of his army and of the Southern people, and 
finally had to be removed. Since the war he has been 
implacable in his antagonism to the Union. He will 
not be reconstructed. During all the contest, per- 
haps, nobody fought better than he did ; but then no- 
body else ever got such an awful licking. 



CEDAR CREEK. 35 

The true account of the marches, battles, and priva- 
tion of that wonderful corps, formerly Jackson's and 
later Ewell's, needs no embellishing. 

Some of his regiments recruited early in 1861 
served bravely to the end without being once recruited, 
notably those from Louisiana. The history of officers 
and men is alike worthy the admiration and respect of 
a true soldier. It has been one peculiarity of most of 
the Southern accounts to belittle their opponents and 
tell wonderful stories of their own prowess. Harry 
Gilmor, the renowned freebooter, if you are to believe 
the half he tells, ought to have defeated our whole 
cavalry alone ; but really his notoriety was gained by 
plundering sutlers' wagons, and running railroad trains 
off the track, and robbing the passengers. Even Mos- 
by's men, a much more effective body of troops, were 
at the best military highwaymen, who never partici- 
pated in any regular battles. Their leader was at 
times capable of generosity, but he had a set of offi- 
cers (some of them deserters from our army) who ri- 
valed the deeds of Captain Kidd. Mosby's battalion 
numbered in October, 1864, 1,600 men with six guns. 
Besides him and Gilmor there were other guerrilla 
bands under McNiel and others. These irregular 
troops, though nominally regular and under regularly 
commissioned officers, made the contest a bitter one, 
and caused Sheridan to detach large forces to watch 
them and cruard the trains from their incursions. Al- 
together it is probable that Sheridan's army outnum- 
bered Early's two to one ; but at Cedar Creek Early 
had as many men in line at four o'clock p. m. as 
Sheridan. 



36 CEDAR CREEK. 

But at that hour a man commanded the Union army 
who never gave up until he was beaten. The sight 
of him was enough to turn the tide of stragglers, and 
when he rode along the line of battle before the at- 
tack the victory was half won. 

Few officers who served in this war but became 
some time or other witnesses of that dreadful scene — 
a panic — all who saw one know how completely 
even brave men become demoralized in consequence. 
The personality of General Philip H. Sheridan with 
an army demoralized by panic turned a woful disaster 
into one of the handsomest victories of the war at 
Cedar Creek, October 19, 1864. 



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